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Abstract
This article interrogates the operating logic of China’s street-level regulatory
state, demonstrating that residents’ committees (RCs) assume a role as regu-
latory intermediaries to enhance the efficiency of local governance. Using
Shanghai’s new recycling regulations as a case study, it explores the mechan-
isms by which RCs elicit not only citizens’ compliance but also active par-
ticipation. We show that the central mechanisms derive from the RCs’
skilful mobilization of particular social forces, namely mianzi and guanxi,
which are produced within close-knit social networks inside Shanghai’s
housing estates (xiaoqu). We advance three arguments in the study of
China’s emerging regulatory state. First, we show how informal social forces
are employed in regulatory governance at the street level, combining
authoritarian control with grassroots participation. Second, the focus on
RCs as regulatory intermediaries reveals the important role played by
these street-level administrative units in policy implementation. Third, we
suggest that the RCs’ harnessing of informal social forces is essential not
only for successful policy implementation at street level but also for the
production of the local state’s political legitimacy.
Keywords: social forces; recycling; China; compliance; participation;
regulatory intermediaries
The hours between 6:30pm and 8:30pm are busy ones for Shanghai’s GN xiaoqu
小区 (housing estate). Families members from every apartment descend into the
public courtyard with their rubbish, bagged and sorted into different categories,
in order to throw it into the communal recycling bins. GN, quiet during the day-
time, is re-energized during these two twilight hours and brims with the sounds of
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chattering as volunteers in green tabards instruct confused residents on their rub-
bish disposal, overseen by the residents’ committee members and the occasional
plain-clothed official. Residents, volunteers and residents’ committee members
greet each other and gossip at the brightly decorated recycling points, which
are locked and out of use for the rest of the day. For many residents, recycling
has become a fun and interesting social event.
We observed this new daily ritual during our fieldwork in Shanghai in June
2019, two weeks before the city’s waste separation regulations became law. At
that time, several districts in Shanghai had been piloting a new recycling system
for household waste for over a year. By 2020, 46 cities across China are required
to implement such a system, with all cities in China expected to do so by 2025.1
Achieving compliance, however, is not easy: how to ensure that the residents sort
their rubbish into the correct categories, especially when citizens have no prior
experience of recycling and there is a great volume of waste? And can something
more ambitious than mere compliance be generated which could help to foster
greater legitimacy for China’s system of local governance – for example, active
and voluntary participation in activities related to recycling?
In 2017, following years of ineffective regulation that failed to effect behavioural
change, central government policymakers designated local residents’ committees
( juweihui 居委会; RC hereafter) as the central actors in ensuring compliance.
Formally, RCs are autonomous organizations, responsible for managing
street-level governance across three or four xiaoqu; however, in practice, they are
inextricably linked to the structure of government. In the case of Shanghai’s new
recycling regulations, local RCs have been encouraged to develop a wide toolbox
of mechanisms to ensure not only compliance with the new rules but also to elicit
a form of active participation in additional, voluntary activities associated with
recycling. For instance, not only do many RCs use CCTV cameras and enlist
local police to act as symbolic threats, they have also developed unique compliance
mechanisms which exploit the xiaoqu’s close-knit social environment and the resi-
dents’ social considerations ofmianzi面子 (reputation/self-image), including pub-
licly shaming poorly performing housing blocks and enlisting children to help
supervise adults. To elicit participation, these RCs utilize guanxi 关系 (reciprocal
relationship), which mobilizes residents through interpersonal networks, allowing
RCs to recruit and oversee a team of volunteers, instead of using officials, to moni-
tor compliance.2Motivated by the social forces ofmianzi and guanxi, residents not
only passively comply with but also actively participate in the recycling process.
In the context of the implementation of Shanghai’s recycling legislations, we
consider the RC as a regulatory intermediary, defined by Kenneth Abbott and
colleagues as “any actor that acts directly or indirectly in conjunction with a regu-
lator to affect the behaviour of a target.”3 In our study, the regulator is the
1 MOHURD 2019.
2 Across Shanghai’s xiaoqu, over 30,000 volunteers were recruited to manage compliance with the recyc-
ling regulations (Wang, Hei 2019).
3 Abbott, Levi-Faur and Snidal 2017a, 19.
2 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–22
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Chinese government and the target is the Chinese population. This helps us to
understand the role played by RCs in regulatory governance: the RCs’ close
proximity to the street level gives them direct access to regulatory targets and
enables them to perform a number of tasks, including facilitating implementa-
tion, monitoring compliance and resolving disputes arising during implementa-
tion.4 At the same time, their relative independence from the Chinese
government enables them to adapt the regulations to the specific circumstances
of their xiaoqu, greatly contributing both to successful implementation and to
the development of best practices.5
This article explores the techniques employed by RCs to produce both compli-
ance with and participation in Shanghai’s recycling regulations. In doing so, we
seek to contribute to three areas of scholarship in the field of Chinese regulatory
governance. First, we provide an exploration of the way in which informal social
norms and social forces are employed in regulatory governance in an authoritar-
ian context, an area which is, to date, relatively understudied. Studies of regula-
tory governance in China concentrate on economic regulation in order to explain
how decentralization contributes to rapid economic development,6 rather than on
social regulation, which explores the various rules governing the behaviour of
societal actors. Most studies of social regulation in China discuss styles of envir-
onmental management and innovations in environmental policy implementation,7
the impact of the increasing involvement of environmental actors in regulatory gov-
ernance (NGOs, citizens and judges) on state–society relations,8 and the tension
between decentralized regulation and authoritarian practices of governance.9
They reveal the emergence of a unique regulatory style in China, according to
which the party-state requires societal participation in regulatory processes while
seeking to mitigate the accompanying loss of political control. Consistent with
this, we show how this combination of civic engagement and authoritarian control
is achieved at the street level by RCs through their deployment of mianzi within
dense, interpersonal networks of social relations and acquaintances. We suggest
that it is these dynamic and informal interactions, rather than stable and formal
bureaucratic structures, which form the foundations of regulatory compliance at
the street level in China. In this way, we add an important non-Western case to
the literature on the use of social forces in regulatory governance.10
Second, we employ the Regulator-Intermediary-Target (RIT hereafter) frame-
work developed by Abbott and colleagues to capture the pivotal role of the RC in
Chinese grassroots regulatory governance.11 This framework, which conceives of
4 Ibid., 22.
5 Ibid., 23.
6 Harwit 2008; Hsueh 2011.
7 Ma and Ortolano 2000; Lo, Fryxell and van Rooij 2009.
8 Zhang and Barr 2013; van Rooij, Stern and Fürst 2016.
9 Wang, Shaoguang 2006; Yang 2017.
10 Grasmick, Bursik, Jr. and Kinsey 1991; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; van Rooij et al. 2017.
11 Abbott, Levi-Faur and Snidal 2017a; 2017b.
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an indirect relationship between the regulator and the target,12 has not yet been
studied in an authoritarian context and might seem an unlikely case, since such
polities are commonly thought to rely on coercion and repression to induce
behavioural change. Indeed, a popular misunderstanding of Chinese governance
is that its government exercises comprehensive top-down control over society. We
demonstrate that this is both a simplification and an overstatement. When new
regulations are introduced, even an authoritarian government requires intermedi-
aries to operate as a “go-between,”13 interacting with society at the grassroots
level in order to reach every citizen, obtain feedback for policy adjustment and
facilitate concrete implementation. Dependence on an RC’s capacities as an
intermediary leads to its transformation into an arm of the regulator, which
empowers the RC to engage with the residents. While much has been written
on the RC, its function in the context of regulatory governance has not yet
been explored. The RIT framework enables us to capture better the complicated
dynamic between state and society at the street level in China, to understand the
capacity as well as the limitations of China’s modern authoritarian regime when
it comes to regulatory governance, and to achieve a more in-depth exploration of
manifestations of Chinese regulatory statehood.
Third, we suggest that the RC’s harnessing of informal social forces, in particu-
lar guanxi, is essential not only for successful policy implementation at the street
level but also for the production of political legitimacy. We consider legitimacy in
terms of output – perceptions of its effectiveness in managing recycling in the
xiaoqu – and input – its perceived responsiveness to citizens’ demands, garnered
through participation.14 The distinction between input and output legitimacy is
particularly important for understanding the production of popular consent in
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. As Thomas Heberer and Christian
Göbel have argued, while the CCP has generally relied on output legitimacy in
terms of its provision of material goods to citizens, the development of the RC
as a means of fostering local participatory governance in China must be seen
as “an attempt to increase input legitimacy, albeit in a very limited and circum-
scribed fashion.”15 It suggests that there is a recognition that providing material
benefits is no longer enough to secure consent in China’s political system and that
a positive orientation to the structure of rule must be fostered within citizens. One
of the ways in which this occurs is through the participatory activities organized
by RCs.
It is worth noting that the successful operationalization of social forces in local
governance relies partly on the social ecology of the xiaoqu and the capability of
the RC to engage it. The RC may fail to establish an effective social network in
which guanxi and mianzi can be meaningfully deployed, either in a new
12 Levi-Faur and Starobin 2014.
13 Abbott, Levi-Faur and Snidal 2017a, 19.
14 Scharpf 1999; Schmidt 2013.
15 Heberer and Göbel 2011, 13.
4 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–22
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commercial xiaoqu with a relatively short history and where social cohesion is
weak, or where the RC itself is inactive. However, while Shanghai residents are
increasingly moving into newly built neighbourhoods in which social interaction
is less intensive, a majority are still living in old xiaoqu (lao gong fang 老公房),
especially in the old city centre districts.16 Thus, we suggest that iterations of
the model described below, while not found in every xiaoqu, are widespread.
Following a discussion of the evolution of recycling norms in Chinese legisla-
tion and an elaboration of our methodology, our empirical analysis is advanced
in two parts. First, we delineate the duty-motivated and deterrence-motivated
compliance mechanisms, demonstrating that the deployment of “social forces,”
which involves the use of public embarrassment in front of fellow residents, func-
tions as the most significant factor in eliciting behavioural change. The second
section demonstrates that RCs harness these social forces to induce not only com-
pliance but also participation in additional and voluntary aspects of the regula-
tions. This expands the regulatory capability of the RCs and enables them to
increase input legitimacy. Our research reveals a complex governing strategy at
the street level, which relies on both formal and informal sources of power and
weaves together both coercive and participatory logics.
Shanghai’s Recycling Regulations
Before the 1990s, households were not required to separate their rubbish, and
recycling was conducted with a view towards making profit. Materials with a
market value, such as glass, paper and metals, were re-sold, much went to landfill
or incineration, and plastic recycling facilities operated informally.17 The idea of
recycling first appeared in Chinese domestic policy documents in 1994, in China’s
“Agenda 21,” but with no detailed terms and rules for implementation.18 In 1996,
the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the Law of the PRC on the
Prevention and Control of Solid Waste Pollution, which enshrined rubbish separ-
ation and household recycling into China’s legal codex.19 In 2004, the Ministry of
Housing and Urban–Rural Development (MOHURD) issued its “Criteria for
the separation and evaluation of household waste,” which for the first time clas-
sified rubbish into six categories.20 In 2007, to consolidate the management sys-
tem of household waste, the MOHURD issued its “Administrative methods for
city waste management.”21 These two regulations sought to involve a variety of
non-governmental organizations and corporations in the waste disposal system,
16 “Shanghai Changning jumin jiating 67% zhuzai laogongfang” (67% of households in Changning,
Shanghai, live in old apartments; the government is considering the classification of residential
areas). Pengpai, 11 December 2015, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1407623.
17 Goldstein 2017.
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with the government issuing licences and conducting inspections. At this point,
the role of citizens was deemed to be one of passive compliance.
Since then, studies undertaken both by academics and the Chinese government
have found that compliance has been extremely weak and that problems, includ-
ing an overriding sense of public apathy and low levels of enforcement, have per-
sisted.22 Surveys conducted in 2014 showed that nearly half of citizens had no
idea about the different categories of waste or indeed what could be recycled.23
According to the NPC Standing Committee’s 2017 report on the enforcement
of the 1996 law, the problems arising from the way in which the recycling system
was established, and how it was managed and enforced, stemmed mostly from an
over reliance on the regulator, namely the government.24 A decision was taken to
shift the focus towards public education and public participation; however,
beyond the RC, the government has no direct access to residents. Hence, an inter-
mediary was required which could make better contact with targets to inculcate,
supervise and monitor new behaviour.
In 2017, the MOHURD issued its “Implementation plan for the separation of
household waste,” which changed the state’s approach in two fundamental
ways.25 First, in contrast to the previous model, which barely mentioned citizens,
the document established the importance of citizen participation in the operation
of the recycling system by emphasizing “government promotion and public par-
ticipation.” Second, it was proposed that the RC be used to improve citizen par-
ticipation and volunteering. It was thought that its dual-facing position between
government and citizens could enable the RC to manage the implementation pro-
cess at street level and also feed problems and suggestions for improvement back
to the authorities. According to the document, the RC is responsible for “prom-
ulgating the regulations,” “providing advice” and “monitoring residents” to
facilitate the implementation of the policy and to achieve behaviour changes.
Like the rest of China, Shanghai has a huge waste problem. In 2018, the city’s
24 million residents produced almost 26,000 tonnes of rubbish daily.26 Shanghai
is the first Chinese city to begin compulsory waste separation and to enshrine it in
local legislation.27 After several rounds of adjustment, Shanghai’s citizens must
now sort their rubbish into four categories: recyclable rubbish (including plastic
and cardboard), hazardous rubbish (batteries and lightbulbs), wet rubbish (com-
postable rubbish/kitchen rubbish) and dry rubbish (other rubbish).28 Failure to
do so is punishable by a fine.
In Shanghai, four government departments are involved in regulating recyc-
ling. The first is the landscaping and city appearance administrative bureau
22 Lin 2018; Peng et al. 2018.
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(LCAAB), which leads implementation by making plans, setting deadlines and
managing interdepartmental cooperation. Second, the civil affairs bureau
(CAB) manages relevant educational initiatives, social work, volunteering pro-
grammes and social organizations, as well as local Party-building initiatives.
Third, the public security bureau (PSB) acts as the enforcement agency, ensuring
compliance and penalizing non-compliant residents. The final agency is the sub-
district office, the lowest level of government administration. It is the agency that
regularly interacts with RCs, rather than making policy or coordinating from
above.
The RC is not formally a government agency. Although the RC has
existed since the 1950s, its role in local governance was transformed in the
1980s as market-oriented reformers disbanded the danwei 单位 (work unit) sys-
tem, which had until then been responsible for the distribution of welfare to citi-
zens.29 Every urban resident has access to a designated RC, which is structured
according to the resident’s xiaoqu. Article 2 of the 1989 Law of the
Organization of Residents’ Committees defines the RC as “a grassroots autono-
mous organization for the realization of residents’ self-management, self-
education and self-service.”30 The RC primarily organizes socially oriented activ-
ities and services for residents. It relies on residents’ voluntary participation in
offering these services, which can include assisting with childcare and support
for the elderly, and in organizing diverse leisure activities and public festivals.31
As one RC member explained, “The government does not require every commu-
nity to do the same thing. There is innovation in each residential area. We facili-
tate residents to discuss the management of the community on their own.”32
Residents also rely on the RC for services and assistance such as the distribution
of welfare subsidies, the provision of employment and training services, and
for resolving issues surrounding household registration.33 At the same time, the
RC is financed by the government, its director and secretary are selected by
the government, and the activities it organizes are always in line with the govern-
ment’s social agenda. And the government requires information and feedback
from the RC to ensure the development of effective public policy. Thus, the
RC constitutes the nuanced, middle layer between government and society,
with dependence upon both.34 According to one RC member, “Our main con-
cern every day is how to satisfy both the ‘up’ [officers] and the ‘down’
[residents].”35
29 Gui 2008; Heberer 2009.
30 NPC 1989.
31 Bray 2006, 535; Heberer and Göbel 2011.
32 1M1.
33 Tomba 2014, 46.
34 Ibid., 5.
35 Quoted in Gui 2008, 46.
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Methodology
The authors spent two months between May and July in 2019 conducting 56
semi-structured interviews in nine xiaoqu belonging to two districts in
Shanghai: Changning 长宁, in the historical city centre, and Pudong 浦东, one
of the newest districts, which has seen rapid economic development since the
1990s. One year previously, Changning had been selected as a trial district for
the development of new approaches to household waste management, while
RCs in Pudong were in the final stages of preparations for the regulations enter-
ing into force on 1 July 2019. The nine xiaoqu are relatively similar, containing
apartments aged between 12 and 42 years, and ranging in price from 56,000
yuan (US$7,800) to 86,000 yuan (US$12,000) per square metre, which suggests
a relatively wide range of income level, social class and community cohesion.
Hence, the two districts and the xiaoqu vary across a wide range of factors and
together constitute a cross-section of urban Shanghai. We chose not to compare
implementation of the regulations across the two districts, focusing instead on
using the two field sites to build a generalized picture of recycling in Shanghai.
Overall, we found that three xiaoqu successfully operated the model described
below (two in Changning and one in Pudong); four xiaoqu operated elements
of it, and two did not operate it at all, either owing to an inactive RC
(Changning) or a lack of close-knit community (Pudong).
We began by interviewing the RC members responsible for regulating recycling
in all nine of the xiaoqu. These interviews lasted between half an hour and two
hours, during which we asked the RC members to describe their involvement
in the implementation of the recycling regulations, how they interact with local
residents, and their relationship to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We
then interviewed randomly selected residents and volunteers, visiting the xiaoqu
throughout the day so as to cover residents of varying ages, occupations and life-
styles. We asked the residents about their recycling-related activities and also for
their views on the recycling regulations and the competency of their RC. One resi-
dent invited us to her home to demonstrate to us how she separated her rubbish.
Third, we interviewed recycling managers in two xiaoqu. These individuals were
employed by the local government to conduct the unenviable job of re-sorting
residents’ poorly sorted waste, for a monthly salary of 900 yuan (US$125).
Interviewees also included one official from the Changning district LCAAB,
one from the Changning CAB, and three NGO members involved in the recyc-
ling process in the two districts.36 In addition to the interviews, we examined
the recycling arrangements in each xiaoqu, observing residents and recycling
managers as they disposed of their rubbish. Owing to the gendered nature of
grassroots participation in community affairs, the majority of the RC respon-
dents, NGO members and volunteers were female, while the government officials
36 O1.
8 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–22
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were male.37 To balance this, we sought to achieve an even split across the resi-
dents we interviewed.
The interviews were recorded using a Dictaphone and were then transcribed.
We mined the texts for descriptions of the ways in which each actor engaged
with new regulations and their relationships to the CCP and local RC. We
then coded the interview texts according to the conceptual categories of “compli-
ance” and “participation.” This analysis is complemented by observations made
during the fieldwork. Appendix Table 1 provides a list of the interviewees.
Compliance
The study of compliance has hitherto “been predominantly Western,” with no
evidence of “whether existing theories and findings also apply elsewhere.”38
This section demonstrates that theories of compliance can indeed be applied
in the case of China. The extant literature suggests that compliance motivations
fall along a continuum, from duty-oriented to deterrence-oriented.39
Duty-oriented motivations are based on a sense of moral obligation to “do the
right thing” and corresponding regulatory approaches work through the targets’
perception of compliance as ethical behaviour.40 Deterrence-oriented motiva-
tions are based on targets’ strategic calculations aimed at maximizing expected
gains and minimizing losses. Thus, corresponding regulatory approaches employ
threats of sanctions and/or provision of material rewards.41 Scholars of regula-
tion usually regard appeals to social forces (also sometimes referred to as social
influences or social licence), which mobilize threats of shame and embarrass-
ment, as a form of deterrence.42 In contrast to shame or guilt, which is self-
imposed through internalized norms, feelings of embarrassment are socially
imposed – that is, they occur when one feels to have been judged negatively
by significant others (friends, family, employer, etc.).43 Concomitantly, social
psychology scholars have distinguished two types of social norms underlying
compliance: descriptive and injunctive, with the former eliciting compliance
through social information (observing others and internalizing their behaviour
as “correct”) and the latter deploying fears of social evaluation (fear of what
others might think).44 In China, social forces are experienced primarily as the
pressure to maintain mianzi (directly translated as “face”).45 The mianzi-driven
consideration is most effective in a close-knitted social network of interwoven
personal relationships, forming what has been termed China’s “acquaintance
37 Chen, Suqiang, Fung and Hung 2017.
38 van Rooij et al. 2017, 73.
39 Lee 2008; 2011; Carter 2016.
40 Malloy 2003.
41 Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Kagan and Scholz 1984; Scholz 1984a; 1984b.
42 Grasmick and Bursik 1990; Grasmick, Bursik, Jr. and Kinsey 1991; Koski and May 2006; May 2005.
43 Grasmick and Bursik 1990.
44 Schultz 1998; Cialdini 2007; Bertoldo and Castro 2016.
45 Hu, Hsien Chin 1944; Ho 1976.
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society.”46 This network of mutual acquaintances and significant others estab-
lishes the social basis of the injunctive social norm, generating fear of public
embarrassment, which in turn induces behavioural conformity. The xiaoqu is
the epitome of such a social network. RCs exploit these social forces to achieve
compliance with the recycling regulations. In the remainder of this section, we
illustrate with empirical evidence the duty- and deterrence-driven approaches
to compliance at Shanghai’s street level, demonstrating how social forces are
essential in eliciting compliance.
Duty
We begin with the idea of duty as it provides the discursive and value-driven
foundations upon which compliance is enforced. Our interview data reveal
three values that are utilized to instil a sense of civic duty in Shanghai’s xiaoqu:
political values, which frame recycling as the right course of action because the
CCP is endorsing it; ecological values, which frame recycling as important in
order to protect the environment; and international values, which compare
China’s waste problem with that of other countries. Each of these three narratives
present a normative, ethically oriented argument for compliance.
Perhaps the most common narrative was the idea that Party building (dangjian
党建) – improvements in the quality of Party activities and the exercise of strict
discipline – is fundamental to the success of the city’s recycling programme.47
According to this narrative, local CCP cadres are considered to be the primary
legitimate actors in the implementation process owing to the CCP’s ability to
unite and mobilize residents. One RC member highlighted the important role
Party building plays in legitimizing policy enforcement: “We must advocate
that government should play a role in propaganda, organization and guidance.
China has a unique feature compared to other countries, namely, Party building.
The Party and the government take the leadership, and all work is advocated by
our government.”48 Political narratives were popular among residents, with some
making reference to Xi Jinping’s 习近平 support of recycling: “if Chairman Xi is
talking about recycling, it must be right, mustn’t it?”49 Posters bearing
Xi Jinping’s statements are displayed in both work places and residential areas,
supported by slogans such as “hearts come together and the rubbish is separated”
(人心聚起来，垃圾分出来 renxin ju qilai, laji fen chulai) and recycling-themed
artwork depicting happy and harmonious communities on the walls of the public
areas in the xiaoqu.
Environmental considerations positing recycling as an ethical duty that contri-
butes to the public good were also frequently mentioned by interviewees.
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Residents told us that recycling “benefits the country and the people,”50 and that
it is “a meaningful thing, it should be done.”51 One resident explained that
“Everyone should do something for the country towards environmental protec-
tion … Yes, I feel obligated. It is your duty when you live in this place.”52 In
other words, it is one’s social obligation to comply because failure to do so
will degrade the environment for all. Environmental narratives are promoted
through training sessions conducted by local social organizations as well as
through media.
The third set of value-oriented considerations underpinning support for recyc-
ling made reference to the international context. Interviewees saw recycling as
something that developed nations do and something that China needed to
catch up on. Keeping up with developed countries to maintain national honour
legitimizes the recycling policy and was regarded as a form of civic duty. One resi-
dent explained, “This is not a future problem, we ought to do it now. Because
foreign countries are doing it now. We usually see on TV that Japan and
South Korea are very mature, but we are just beginning to do something
good.”53 An RC member stated that it was embarrassing that Shanghai, as an
international city, was performing so badly: “As an international metropolis,
Shanghai does not do a good job with its recycling. We should do it properly,
like people in Japan and Taiwan. Shanghai is an international city, but can we
recycle? … [our lack of recycling] makes us look shameful.”54
Deterrence
It became mandatory to separate domestic rubbish in Shanghai on 1 July 2019.
In order to enforce the new regulations, RCs have developed a wide range of
mechanisms to compel citizens to change their behaviour. We divide these
mechanisms into two groups: formal mechanisms, which use the new legislation,
and informal mechanisms, which deploy the xiaoqu’s social network.
The new recycling legislation is of course an important framework for deter-
rence: citizens who fail to separate their rubbish before disposal now face a
fine of up to 200 yuan (approximately US$30). The RCs have strongly welcomed
the new legislation: “[For those unwilling to recycle], we let them know that it’s
law now. It’s no longer something for deliberation.”55
To facilitate enforcement, surveillance systems have been established across the
city. In some xiaoqu, RCs use video cameras in the communal waste disposal
rooms to identify disobedient residents. Committee members then pay a visit
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recruited on a voluntary basis to stand beside the communal waste disposal room
and supervise the residents, particularly in areas without CCTV facilities. To cut
costs and the number of hours for which volunteers are needed, the government
has introduced a policy which restricts when residents may dispose of their rub-
bish (prior to the new regulations, rubbish bins in xiaoqu had been accessible all
day). Now, residents may only dispose of their rubbish during a designated time
period, usually between 7am and 9am, and 7pm and 9pm. Outside of these desig-
nated times, the rubbish bins are moved away and the waste disposal rooms
locked.
Deterrence not only works through the exercise of sanctions but also through
threats of sanctions. For example, the CCTV facility conveys the image of a
powerful state with knowledge of every citizen’s public move, even when the cam-
eras are not in use. This feeling of being watched leads to self-examination as a
disciplinary process.56 When the RCs assemble residents for training and recyc-
ling activities, they “frequently invite police officers from the public security bur-
eau” to demonstrate the authorities’ seriousness and determination in enforcing
recycling.57 The police presence functions as a symbol of coercive power,
which breeds fear of the severe consequences of disobedience. In fact, few citizens
have been fined for non-compliance. In the first two weeks of August, only 19
fines were issued to individuals, compared with 3,668 cases of verbal criticism
and education by police officers.58 Only in cases where a resident persistently
refuses to cooperate do RC members summon police or urban management offi-
cers. As one RC member explained, “politeness first, force second.”59 RC mem-
bers cultivate the threat of coercive power in the minds of residents as a first port
of call in regulatory enforcement; however, in reality, coercive force is used as a
very last resort, when all other resources have been exhausted.
Perhaps the most effective mechanism in eliciting compliance is not the threat
of formal sanctions but the fear of being judged negatively by others, generated
through “social forces.” RCs have developed creative compliance mechanisms
that rely on threats of loss of face. Here, we delineate three such mechanisms,
which have either been observed during our field work or described to us in
interviews.
First, RC members and volunteers stand beside the rubbish bins during the
designated times in order to supervise the residents and, as one RC member
described it, “When residents bring unseparated garbage, we stretch our hands
into the garbage to separate it in front of them … It is summer now, wet garbage
is dirty and smelly. We are also residents living here, right? We do such dirty
work in the hot weather, and we want nothing in return. In this way, they are
moved and are persuaded to change their behaviour.”60 This process, although
56 Foucault 1977, 209.
57 1M1, 4M1, O2.
58 Hu, Yurong 2019.
59 1M1.
60 Ibid.
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presented as assistance, makes residents feel embarrassed and they lose face.
Another RC member explained that the RC members and “volunteers are
neighbours – rather than cleaners who are paid.”61 This “embarrassing” assist-
ance within a close-knit social network has proved to be very effective at chan-
ging residents’ behaviour.
Second, someRCmembers and volunteers encourage their children to participate
in the supervision. If a child criticizes anadult for incorrectly disposingof the rubbish,
the feeling of embarrassment is even greater since the adult is expected to be the
responsible one and to supervise and set an example for the child, not vice versa.62
Additionally, children, as a symbol of honesty and innocence, carry a particularly
strongmoral weight. OneRCmember told us that, “when [the children] are educated
[in the recycling regulations], they can also supervise older people…The children are
very serious. They’re more serious than adults.”63
Third, some RCs put a board by the entrance of each housing block in the
xiaoqu to publicize how well each block is doing with its recycling (some even
detail the individual households). Every block is overseen by a “block leader”
(louzhang 楼长), who helps the RC to distribute notices, collect feedback on pol-
icy implementation issues, resolve disputes among neighbours and organize the
residents to undertake collective tasks. Block leaders help RC members monitor
recycling activities in each block. High-performing blocks are awarded a red star,
and those who perform poorly are awarded a black star, with results regularly
updated and publicly displayed.64 This strategy motivates residents’ sense of hon-
our and compels them to behave better. Block leaders’ position of responsibility
motivates them even more: one told us, “When we block leaders find that our
blocks are on the board as ‘black’ ones, we’re worried to death. This is important
to us. Mianzi is important to Shanghai people.”65
The manipulation of social forces to achieve citizens’ compliance is common
among the RCs in Shanghai’s xiaoqu, and is an efficient means to change citizens’
behaviour, facilitate recycling and enhance output legitimacy. Compared to the exer-
cise of deterrence in the form of penalties or the deployment of police officers, social
forces are much more time-consuming to invoke, requiring skills, patience and the
maintenance of a network of acquaintances. RCs choose this more difficult route
because they need not only superficial compliance from citizens but also long-term
cooperation and participation. Hence, RCs cultivate an environment in which
citizens participate into the regulatory chain as actors rather than as mere recipients,
employing the social forces within the xiaoqu to mobilize citizens to engage of their




64 This innovation is rooted in the 1990s’ practice of awarding red stars to rural families based on their
performance in ten criteria of good behaviour, one of which was hygiene and included maintaining
“green, clean and beautiful surroundings” (Thøgersen 2000, 139).
65 1M3.
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Participation
In China, participatory governance is important for the regime’s input legitim-
acy. Indeed, in authoritarian states, local authorities are dependent on civic
agency – but only on those forms that can be successfully managed from
above.66 In this section, we show that the social networks established by RCs
in the xiaoqu motivate citizens to engage beyond compliance to participate in
the voluntary, additional aspects of the regulatory process. This participation
forms the basis of China’s authoritarian regulatory state.
Existing studies highlight a wide range of factors that influence an interest in
political participation, including means (spare time and money), motive (concern
about specific policy matters), internal political efficacy (perception of one’s own
competence as a political actor), and external political efficacy (perception of
whether the political system is responsive to popular demands).67 Our fieldwork
shows that participation can also be stimulated by the social pressure arising from
one’s position within an interwoven personal network. This is known in China as
guanxi and can be translated as “reciprocity.”68 This network-driven motivation
to participate plays the most important role among all types of motivation with
regard to recycling in the xiaoqu. Material incentives, ethical considerations, self-
realization as a volunteer, the desire to gain respect from fellow residents, and
feelings of responsibility all contribute to the achievement of active participation
in the recycling regulations, but they are fungible, while participation cannot be
achieved without the function of the network and the social pressure it generates.
The process of volunteer recruitment provides evidence for this.
RCs are responsible for signing up volunteers, mostly via door-to-door invita-
tions, internal recommendations and Party member mobilization. Only in a few
exceptions do RCs put out a general call for volunteers. The reason for this is sim-
ple: general calls do not attract residents because the incentive to participate is not
sufficiently strong. Instead, successful recruitment relies on RCs’ activation of
informal networks. Residents explained, “RC members know the people. They
know the situation in each household … who may have time, who needs to take
care of children so will not be available, they know very well… according to this,
they choose to visit some residents, door-to-door, to ask for their assistance.”69
The RCs have two different network chains at their disposal: RC–block leader–
volunteers, and RC–Party secretary–volunteers. One RC member explained to
us, “At first, we recruit volunteers from among the Partymembers through the plat-
form of Party classes. Andwe also seek help fromblock leaders.”70 The next section
elaborates on these two chains of volunteer recruitment and how the RCs use them
to reach every resident in the xiaoqu.
66 Dimitrov 2014; Owen 2020.
67 Eckstein, Noack and Gniewosz 2013; McAtee and Wolak 2011; Paloniemi and Vainio 2011.
68 Read 2003; Zhu 2010.
69 3R3.
70 7R1.
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RC–block leader–volunteers
As mentioned above, block leaders play an important linking role between RCs
and residents. The recruitment of block leaders is coordinated by the RCs. One
block leader told us how she was recruited: “RC members encouraged me to be
the new block leader when our previous one was getting too old. I said I was
super busy: I had to take care of my mum and my children. But they said it
just had to be me, it just had to be me. Well, OK … [laughs].”71 This individual
was seen as a very responsible woman, and had been friends with members of the
RC for several years – two central considerations for selecting block leaders.
These two factors demonstrate that a successful candidate should be seen as
able to competently navigate the xiaoqu social network.
Block leaders have an even closer relationship with residents than do the RCs.
Thus, responsible block leaders with networking skills greatly alleviate the RCs’
organizational burden. With the help of block leaders, the large task of volunteer
recruitment can be split into several small ones. “We need 40 volunteers in all,
which means at least two from each block. Thus, each block leader is responsible
for recruiting at least two volunteers.”72 From RC members to block leaders, and
from block leaders to volunteers, the recruitment of the volunteers occurs infor-
mally and is based on personal relationships.
RC–Party members–volunteers
Residents who are CCP members form another bridge linking RCs to other resi-
dents. Although they are distinct in the legislation, in practice RCs and the local
Party system are hard to separate, since they share resources, objectives and even
the same office within the xiaoqu. The Party secretary is always an RC member,
and is often also its leader. In contrast to the block leader, Party members fall
under the leadership of the Party secretary, making their mobilization by the
RC relatively easy. In principle, each Party member must respond to the call
for volunteers; however, in practice, personal relationships play a decisive role.
One RC member shared: “Yes, we say that Party members should stand on
the first line, but it is impossible to make it compulsory. It may be inconvenient
for some people, some people may have no time, so it really depends. You can
force people to separate their rubbish according to the law, but you can’t force
them to be volunteers. Force does not work in this matter.”73 As a result, even
with the help of the formal Party system, RC members still need to use their
informal personal networks to encourage Party members to be volunteers.
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Input legitimacy is further generated through the volunteer network. In one
xiaoqu, we came across a group of retired women. Only one of them was a for-
mally designated volunteer; the others were friends who had chosen to accom-
pany her. They were sitting by the recycling bins chatting with each other and
greeting the passing residents. When someone came to the bins to dispose of rub-
bish, all of the women took responsibility for supervision and assistance.
Although some were not recruited volunteers, they nevertheless participated as
if they were. When we asked the RC about this, we were told: “Now the garbage
house is becoming a gathering point. Residents are willing to sit there for a chat.
It is turning into a space for their social lives … a platform.”74 This development
has exceeded the RC’s expectations: participation in recycling is motivated by
pressure from an informal governance network; it additionally functions to fit
in with residents’ social agenda.
Thus, in contrast to the production of output legitimacy as achieved by com-
pliance alone, additional voluntary participation contributes towards both output
and input legitimacy – not only creating a clean living environment but also fos-
tering active engagement in community governance, thereby reinforcing RCs as
legitimate governing bodies. These comments from one RC member illustrate
how the recycling regulations connect the two types of legitimacy: “When we cat-
egorize waste, we’re not just telling people to sort their rubbish, we’re telling them
that our ultimate goal is to make our community better. This is very good and the
residents are very interested. It’s not only trying to help with the rubbish sorting,
it’s primarily to make our lives better and inspire enthusiasm.”75 Later, the same
RC member explained, “Let residents not only feel that recycling is meaningful
but also that it is very interesting. We are now thinking about how to make resi-
dents feel interested.”76 This encouragement of interest within the residents is an
essential part of the RCs’ responsibilities and is cultivated through the deploy-
ment of the xiaoqu social network. It is the social networks and resources that
make RCs irreplaceable intermediaries with a pivotal role to play in grassroots
regulatory governance, successfully motivating residents to participate, thereby
strengthening the overall structure of social control.
Conclusion
This article has shown that social forces are an indispensable tool for RCs in their
capacity as regulatory intermediaries in Shanghai’s recycling regulations, both in
ensuring comprehensive compliance and in eliciting active participation.
Compliance is encouraged through sanctions and the threat of sanctions, moral
narratives and the fear of losing face, while participation is actualized informally
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behaviour in accordance with the policy and enhances the regime’s output legit-
imacy, while participation transforms this compliance into active engagement in
and positive identification with the regulations, bolstering the regime’s input
legitimacy.
We have shown that the key institution for curating these two dynamics is the
RC. As the intermediary between the regulator and the targets, the RC embodies
both the top-down structure of the party-state and the bottom-up nature of the
local community. This unique organizational logic enables the RC to influence
and shape the power structure within the RIT regulatory chain. Through the
manipulation of social forces, formal regulations are implemented informally.
Moreover, the interaction between RC members and residents consists of the
exchange of social expectations, rather than the direct exertion of authority,
which leads to the greater independence of citizens and more space for
bi-directional influences. This reflects the convergence of authoritarian and grass-
roots governing styles that is a characteristic of the Chinese regulatory state.
Two further conclusions can be drawn from our findings. First, even authori-
tarian governments delegate aspects of governance to intermediaries. This
demonstrates that theories of regulatory governance that have been developed
in the context of democracies do have explanatory power in other locales. At
the same time, cultural mechanisms are crucial for the successful uptake of
new regulations. In our case, the socially embedded practices of mianzi and
guanxi ensure that citizens both comply with and actively participate in the
new recycling regulations. Cultural factors are often overlooked in the literature
on regulatory governance, but Shanghai’s recycling regulations would have faced
substantial hurdles without the weaving of these two important practices into the
implementation process. Although social forces are also deployed in the govern-
ance of Western countries, we have shown that they play a central role in the
Chinese context, serving as the basis of the RCs’ governance capacity. The
importance of cultural factors shows that while similar forms of regulatory gov-
ernance may be adopted across contexts, it is not a case of simple transfer of regu-
latory norms. Instead, the ways in which they are embedded in alternative
socio-political contexts, and made meaningful to local actors, are highly context
specific. These processes of embedding and meaning-making are important for
understanding how regulatory governance works in practice, and are best
accessed through in-depth, ethnographic-oriented fieldwork.
Second, the RCs’ attempts to produce not only compliance but also participa-
tion points to the way in which regulatory governance is being employed to
enhance China’s overall regime legitimacy. Active participation is important
for increasing input legitimacy – that is, the feeling that the local state is an
embodiment of the people’s will: Shanghai citizens who volunteer their time
and engage in additional activities organized by the RCs demonstrably accept
CCP authority and parameters of governance. The RCs’ task of engaging citi-
zens’ interest in recycling by organizing appealing events, framing participation
as a social activity and mobilizing informal networks is an essential part of
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local authoritarian governance. Thus, rather than constituting a sign of greater
delegation and, hence, pluralism in policy processes, regulatory governance can
be employed in order to bolster authoritarian rule.
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Appendix
Table 1: Cited Interviews
Code Date Location Description
1M1 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 1 RC member
O1 5 June 2019 Sub-district office Official
7V1 5 June 2019 Xiaoqu 7 Volunteer
3R1 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 3 Resident
2R1 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 2 Resident
3R2 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 3 Resident
6R1 5 June 2019 Xiaoqu 6 Resident
1M2 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 1 RC member
4M1 5 June 2019 Xiaoqu 4 RC member
O2 5 June 2019 LCAAB office Official
1M3 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 1 RC member
3R3 4 June 2019 Xiaoqu 3 Resident
7R1 5 June 2019 Xiaoqu 7 RC member
8M1 18 June 2019 Xiaoqu 8 RC member
Note:
In order to preserve the anonymity of our interviewees, we have replaced the names of the xiaoqu with numbers 1–9.
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